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This case concerns record piracy and the copyright laws • 
/I \ \ 
gxxx Record piracy is a 
""-
._ 
thriving industry in which the~ pirate 
takws a record and tapes ±R it. From the tape, he produces 
his own record. The industry has recently begun to thrive 
E~Eaooll because recent KRENRXXNg±Hxx technicological developments 
have made such a practice profitable. Records , however, are '? -
not covered by the federal copyright laws. Congress has 
enacted a law giving them some coverage, but it only covers 
CONTROLLING CASES: Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 
376 U.S. 225 (1964) ; Compco Corp v. Day-Brite Light~ng, Inc., 




- 2- ( 
recordings made after Feb. 15, 1972. The petr made and sold 
copies of records recorded before that «x~x date. He was 
prosecuted under a Cal state law making it a me misdemeanor 
to copy a recording with intent to sell it. 
Petr argues that the Sears and Compco decisions are 
dispositive of this case. In those cases, the Court ruled 
that a state could not make it a crime to copy a mechanical 
«ekx~ device that was not patented or copyrighted under the 
federal statutes. ----- Petr argues that only Congress can make sound recordings available to be copyrighted and that 
the state's ««Hgx doing xx so is an infringement on the 
federal power. 
Resps rely on a line of cases upholding similar statutes 
in the state and lower federal courts. They say that the 
copyright law explicity recognizes a common law right in --- , • 
unpublished works and that it has never been held that 
the sale of a record of a performance mexx means that the 
performance is in the public domain. Sears and Comoco 
are said to be not controlling because they involved the 
right to imitate or simulate mechanical devices that were 
~---------------------
not patentable. Resp says that for the Cal law to be HHZXHENN 







performance which is on the records, Resp says further that 
there is a common law of copyright NMEX which protects 
records. Finally, resp relies on a somewhat vague reference 
to rights already existing in records which is in the new 
federal statute. 
I think there are some nice questions here such as whether 
the product in question is the record or the performance on 
and 
the record XRNX such as whether peter only copied something 
RNxxxx«ExNNxxlrnxmcxxkexxxXNe I do not 
~
or appropriated it. 
think the issue should be granted because Congress has now 
stepped in and has begun to apply the federal copyright laws 
to records made after 1972. Admitteffily there are a lot of 
records made ~xxEex prior to that time, but since records 
are somewhat faddish and lose their market value rather 
quic~ly--except a few collector's items--there is unlikely 
to be little future piracy of records made before the effective 
date of the federal statute. Since there is no split in ---- -
the circuits and since I have a feeling that this kind of ------------. 
commercial piracy should be outlawed, I wouldxex~ deny. But 
"'- -it is a close case • 
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No. 71- llHZ 
Donald Goldstein, Ru th Koven . 
and Donald Koven , 
Petitioners. 
1'. 
'tate of California. 
On Writ of Certiorari 
to the Appellate De-
partment of the Su-
perior Court of Cali-
fornia for the County 
of Los Angele~. 
ii Tuu P -, iq7:{l 
Memorandum to the ConfrrP11ce troni MR. CHa:F 
JusT1CE BuRGF.H 
This case did not seem easy when we cons1ctered it 
at Conference and the longer r \~·orked on it the mor 
difficult it became The vote was close. certainly very 
tentative as to some. and I confess I have not felt sure-
footed on the subject at any tun!:' 
I suspect that those favormg reversal were concerned 
about Sears and Co111pco Tlw memorandum that fol-
lows undertakes an analysis and treatment that preserves 
the core of those two holdings. lt also "puts the ball 
in the Congresswnal court.·· When. as and if Congress I 
wants to "take over" nothing in an affirmance of the 
California holding will be the slightest barrier. Federal 
power can be as pervasive as Congress desires. 
This case has taken an inordinate amount of time. 
perhaps in part because I underestimated the difficulties. 
I suspect 110 one will find it easy The lateness of the 
date impels me to send this memorandum before I really 
have it in the form I prefer for circulation . Rough as 





GOLDSTEii\' v. CALIFOH::'\IA 
If a majority accept this "tilt.· · l will proceed. I am 
very open to suggestions in this close and difficult case, 
We granted certiorari to review the conviction on 
petitioners under a Califor111a statute making it a crim-
inal offense to duplicate recordings produced by others. 
The claim of petit10ners 1s that the California statute 
conflicts with Art. l. ~ 8. cl. 8. of the Constitution, the 
"copyright clause. 
In 1971, an informat10n was filed by the ~tate of Cali-
fornia, charging petitioners in 140 counts with violating 
¾ 653h of the California Penal Code; it recited that from 
April 1970, to March 1971. petitioners duplicated numer-
ous recordings produced by others and did so without 
their consent.' Petitioners moved to dismiss the com-
plaint on the grounds that ~ 653h was in conflict with 
1 In pertinent part, the Californrn statute provide,- : 
··(a) Every person 1s gmlt~· of a m1,;demeanor who . 
·• (I) Knowmglr and will full~· transfers or cau"'e;,; to be transferred 
any sounds recorded on a phonograph record. . . tape , . . . or 
other article on which ;;ounds are recorded, with mtent to :;ell or 
ca USE' to be ,;old, . such articlP 011 which "ucb sounds are so · 
transferred, without the consPnt of I h(e ow11n 
,, (2) ... 
" (b) As u:;ed m this sert10n, 'person· mPans an)· mdividual part-
nership, corporat1on or association; am! ·owner ' means the person 
who owns the mastPr phonograph record , mastPr tapP , 
or otlwr dPv1cr usPd for rpproducrng recorded sounds on phono-
graph records, . .. tapPs, or otlwr articles on which sound 1s 
recorded, and from which the transferred recorded sounds are di-
rectly or indirectly denvPd 
Specificall~· , each count of the mformation alleged that , 111 regard 
to a particular recordrng , pet1t10ners had. "at and m the Cit~· of Lo;; 
Angeles, in the County of Lo,; Angcle8 , State of Califorrna . 
wilfully , unlawfully and knowmgl~· tran::;ferred and caused to Lie 
transferred sounds recorded on a tape with the mtpnt to ,;ell and 
cause to be sold, such tape Oil which ::;uch :;;ound"' rwere J ::iOJ 
transferred. 
71-1192-MEMO 
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Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. of the Constitution 2 and the federal 
statutes enacted thereunder, Upon denial of their mo-
tion, petitioners entered pleas of nolo contendere to 10 
of the 140 counts; the remaining counts were dismissed. 
On appeal, the Appellate Department of the Superior 
Court sustained the validity of the statute. After ex-
hausting other state appellate remedies. petitioners sought 
review in this Court. 
r 
Petitioners were engaged in what has commonly been 
called "record" or "tape piracy"-the unauthorized 
duplication of recordings of performance by major musi-
cal artists. ' Petitioners would purchase from a re-
tail distributor a smgle tape or photograph recording 
of the popular performances they wished to duplicate. 
The original recordings were produced and marketed by 
recording companies with whom petitioners had no con-
tractual relationship . At petitioner's plant, the record-
ing was reproduced on blank tapes, which could in turn 
be used to replay the music on a tape player . The tape 
was then wound on a cartridge. A label was attached , 
stating the title of the recorded performance-the same 
title as had appeared on the original recording. and the 
name of the performing artists.' After final packaging, 
2 Articlf, I. § H, cl , 8, provides tha1 Congre~:; :;hall have the power 
"To promote the Progre:;:; of Science and usdul Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Author,; and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writmgr,; and D1scovene~ 
"Since petitioners did not proceed to trial, the factual reco rd 
before the C'ourt 1~ ;;parse. However, both parties mdicate that a 
complete descnption of petitioner 's mPthod of 01wration may be found 
111 the record of Tape Industries Assa. of America v Younger, 316 
F Supp. 340 (CD Cal. 1970) , appea l d1smis:;ed for lack of junsd1c-
tion , 401 U.S. 902 (1971). appeal pendmg Uni ted States Court of 
Appeal s, CA\J, ~o. 2G.628 
1 An additional label was attached to each cartndge by pet1t10nen;, 
~rating that no relat10nsh 1p existed between petitwners a nd the pro-
ducer of 1 he ongmal rPcording or thr md1viduab whose performances 
4 
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the tapes were distributed to retail outlets for sale to 
the public, in competition with those petitioners had 
copied. 
Petitioners made no payments to the artists whose 
performances they reproduced and sold, nor to the vari-
ous trust funds established for their benefit; no pay-
ments were made to the producer, technicians, or other 
staff personnel responsible for producing the original re-
cording. No payments were made for the use of the 
artists' names or the album title. 5 
The challenged California statute forbids petitioners 
from transferring any performance fixed on a tape or 
record onto other records or tapes with the intention of 
selling the duplicates, unless they have first received 
permission from those who. under state law, are the 
owners of the master recording. Although the protec-
tion afforded to each master recordmg is substantial, 
lasting for an unlimited time, the scope of the prescribed 
activities is narrow. No limitation is placed on the use 
of the music, lyrics or arrangement employed in making 
the master recording. Petitioners are not precluded from 
hiring their own musicians and artists and recording 
an exact imitation of the performance embodied on the 
master recording. Petitioners are free to hire the same 
artists who made the initial recording in order to dup-
had been recorded . Con,;equently , no claim 1,; made that pet1t1oners 
misrepresented the source of the original recordings or the manu-. 
facturer of the tapes · 
' The costs of producing a ,;mgle ongmaJ long playing record of a 
musical performance may exceed $50,000 or $100,000. Tape Indus-
tries Asso. of America v. Younger, 216 F Supp. , at 344 (1970) ; 
Hearings on S. 646 and H. R. 6927 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the 
Committee on the Judiciary , House of Representatives, 92d Cong., 
1st Sess. , at 27-28 ( 1971) . For the performance recorded on th1,; 
record , petit10ners would pay only the retail co~t of a single long; 
playing record or a ,angle tapf•, 
71-1192-MEM• 
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licate the performance. In essence, the statute thus 
provides copyright protection solely for the specific 
expressions which the master record or tape contains. 
Petitioners' attack on the constitutionality of § 653h 
has many facets. First, they contend that the statute 
esablishes a state copyright of unlimited duration, and 
thus conflicts with Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution. 
Second, petitioners claim that the state statute inter-
feres with the implementation of federal policies, inM 
herent in the federal copyright statutes. 17 U. 8. C. § 1 
et seq. According to petitioners, it was the intention 
of Congress, as interpreted by this Court in Sears, Roe-
buck and Co. v. Stiffle Co., 376 U. S. 225 (1964), and 
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U. S. 234 
(1964), to establish a uniform law throughout the United 
States to protect original writings. As part of the fed-
eral scheme, it is urged that Congress intended to allow 
individuals to copy any work which was not protected by 
a federal copyright. Since § 653h effectively prohibits the 
copying of works which are not entitled to federal protec-
tion , petitioners urge that it conflicts directly with con-
gressional policy and must fall under the Supremacy 
Clause of the Constitution .'; Finally, petitioners argue 
that 17 U. S. C. § 2, which allows States to protect un-
6 In 1971, the federal copyright :;taiute8 were amended to allow 
federal protection of recordings. See Pub. L. 92-140 (Oct. 15, 
1971) . However. § 3 of the amendment ;;pecifi ca lly provides that. 
such protection is to apply only to sound recordings "fixed, published 
and copyrighted on and after ' ' Feb. 15, 1972 , and before Jan. l , 1975, 
and that nothrng m Title 17, as amended, 1s to "be applied retro-
actively or [to] be construed as affect ing m any way any rights with 
respect to sound recordings fixed before'' Feb. 15, 1972. The record-
mgs which pet itioners copied were all fixed pnor to Feb. 15, 1972. 
No question is raised as to the power of State~ to protect recordings 
fixed after that darr. 
6 
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published writings ,7 does not authorize the challenged· 
state provision. Since the records whi6h petitioners-
copied had previously been released to the public, peti-
tioners contend that they had, under federal law, been 
published. 
II 
Petitioners' first argument rests on the premise that 
the state statute under which they were convicted lies 
beyond the~ powers which the States reserved in our 
federal system. If this is correct, petitioners must pre-
vail, since the States cannot exercise a sovereign power 
which, under the Con&titution, they have relinquished to 
the Fed~ral 0-e!wrnment for its exclusive exercise. 
A 
The principle(5 which the Court has followed in con-
struing state power were stated by Alexander Hamilton 
in Number 3Z, of The Federalist : 
"An entire consolidation of the States into one 
eQmplete national sovereignty would imply an en-
tire subordination of the parts; and whatever powers 
might remain in them, would be altogether depend-
ent on the general will. But as the plan of the.: 
[Constitutional 1 convention aims only at a partial 
union or consolidation, the State governments would 
clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which 
they before had, and which were not, by this act, 
exclusively delegated to the United States. This 
exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of 
State sovereignty, would only exist in three cases: 
7 17 U. S. C. § 2-·' Nothmg 111 thi;; title shall be con;:trued to 
11nnul or limit the nght of the author or proprietor of an unpublished 
work, at common law or m equity , to prevent the copying, publica-
tion, or use of such unpublished work without his consent, or to. 
Qbta in damage~ t hPrefor._" 
71-li92-MEMO 
GOLDSTEIN v. CALIFORNIA 7 
where the Constitution in express terms granted-art 
exclusive authority· to the Union; where it granted· 
in one instance an· authority to the Union , and in 
another · prohibited the States from exercising the 
like authority; and where it granted an authority 
to the Union , to which a similar authority in the 
States would be absolutely and totally contradictory 
and repugnant .8 
The first two instances mentioned present no barrier to 
a State's enactment of copyright statutes. The clause of 
the Constitution granting to Congress the power to issue 
copyrights does not provide that such .power shall vest 
exclusively in the Federal Government. Nor does the 
Constitution expressly provide that such power shall 
not be exercised by the States. 
In applying the third phase of the test , we must 
examine the manner in which the power to grant copy-
rights may operate in our federal system. The objectives 
of our inquiry were recognized in Cooley v. Board of 
Wardens, 12 How. (53 "C. S.) 299 (1851 ). when . in deter-
mining whether the power granted to Congress to reg-
ulate commerce" was "compatible with the existence of a 
similar power in the States," the Court noted : 
"Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature. 
national, or admit of only one uniform system, or 
plan of regulation , may Justly be said to be of such 
a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Con-
gress." 12 How. (53 U. S.). at 319. 
The Court's determination that Congress alone may 
legislate over matters which are necessarily national in 
import reflects the basic principle of federalism. "The 
8 A. Hamilton, J . Madison, J. J ay , The Federalist, B. F. Wright , 
ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1961) (hereafter The Federalist) 241 , see 
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How (53 l:. S.) 299. 318-319 (1851) . 
9 Art icle I , § 8, cl ::$. 
8 
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genius and character of the [federal] government," Chief 
Justice Marshall said , 
"seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all 
external concerns of the nation, and to those in-
ternal concerns which affect the States generally; 
but not to those which are completely within a par-
ticular State, which do not affect other States. and 
with which it is not necessary to interfere, for th~ 
purpose of executing some of the general powers ~f 
government." Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 
U. S.) 1, 195 (1824) . 
The question whether exclusive federal power must 
be inferred is not a simple one. for the powers recog-
nized in the Constitution are broad and the nature of 
their application varied . The warning sounded by the 
Court in Cooley may equally be applicable to the "copy 0 
right clause '·: 
"Either absolutely to affirm, or deny that the nature 
of [ the federal power over commerce] requires ex-
clusive legislation by Congress is to lose sight of the 
nature of the subjects of this power, and to assert 
concerning all of them, what is really applicable but 
to a part. 12 How. (53 lJ. S. ) . at 319. 
We must also be careful to distinguish those situations 
in which the concurrent exercise of a power by the 
Federal Government and the States or by the States 
alone may possibly lead to conflicts and those situations 
where conflicts will necessarily arise. Few governmental 
powers exist which , when exercised concurrently by Con-
gress and the various States. will be wholly free from 
conflict. "It is not, however, a mere possibility of in-
convenience in the exercise of powers, but an immediate 
constitutional repugnancy that can by implication alien-
ate and extinguish a preexisting right of [state] sover-
eignty." The Federalist, No. 32, at 24.3, 
71-1192-MEMO 
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Article I, § 8, cl. 8, of the Constitution gives to Con-
gress the power-
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective• 
Writings and Discoveries . ... " 
The clause thus describes both the objective which Con-
gress may seek and the means to achieve it. The objec-
tive is to promote the progress of science and the arts. 
As employed, the terms "to promote" are synonymous 
with the words "to stimulate," "to encourage," or "to 
induce." 10 To accomplish its purpose,. Congress may 
grant to authors the exclusive right to the fruits of their · 
respective works. An author who possesses an unlimited 
copyright may preclude others from copying his creation 
for commercial purposes without permission. In other 
words, to encourage people to devote themselves to in- · 
tellectual and artistic creation, Congress may guarantee 
to authors and inventors a reward in the form of control 
over the sale or commercial use of copies of their works. 
The objective of the copyright clause was clearly 
to facilitate the granting of rights national in scope. 
While the debates on the clause were extremely lim-
ited, its purpose was described by James Madison in 
No. 43 of the Federalist Papers: 
"The utility of this power will scarcely be ques-
tioned. The c~pyright of authors has been solemnly 
adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of com-
mon law. The right to useful inventions seems 
with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The 
public good fully coincides in both cases with the 
claims of individuals. The States cannot sepa-
10 See Kendal,l v. Winsor , 21 How. (62 U. S.) 322, 328 (1858) ; 
Mitchell v. Tilghman. 19 Wall . (86 U. S.) 287, 418 (1873) ; Bauer v. 
O'Donnell, 229 F . S. 1, 10 (1913) . 
10 
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rately make effectual prov1s10n for either of the 
cases, and most of them have anticipated the de-
cision of this point, by laws passed at the instance 
of Congress.11 
The difficulty noted by Madison relates to the burden 
placed on an author or inventor who wishes to achieve 
protection in all States when no federal system of pro-
tection is available. To do so, a separate application 
is required to each state government; the right which in 
turn may be granted has effect only within the granting 
State's borders. 12 The national system which Madison 
supported eliminates the need for multiple applications 
and the expense and difficulty involved. In effect, it 
allows Congress to provide a greater reward than any 
particular State may grant to promote progress in those 
fields which Congress determines are worthy of national 
action. 
Although the copyright clause thus recognizes the po--
tential benefits of a Hational system, it does not indicate• 
that all writings are of national interest or that state 
legislation is, in all cases, unnecessary or precluded. The 
patents granted by the States in the 18th century show. 
to the contrary, a willingness on the part of the States to 
promote those portions of science and the arts which were 
11 The Federalist, at 309 . 
12 Numerous examples may be found in our early history of the-
difficulties which the creators of items of national import had in 
securing protection of their creations in all States. For example,. 
Noah Webster, in his effort to obtain protection for his book, A 
Grammatical Institute of the English Language, brought his claim 
before the legislatures of at least six States, and perhaps as many 
as 12. See B. Bugbee, The Genesis of American Patent and Copy-
right Law (Wash., D . C., 1967) 108-110, 120-124 ; H. R. Rep. No. 
2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1909). Similar difficulties were 
experienced by John Fitch and other inventors who desired to pro-
tect their efforts to perfect a steamboat. See Federico, State Patent~ .. 
13 J, of th"? Patent O1:fi_ce Soci_ety 166, 170-176 (1931 ), 
71-1192-MEMO 
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of local importance. 1 0 Whatever the diversity of people's 
backgrounds, origins and interests in the 13 colonies and 
whatever the variety of business and industry in the 
colonies, the range of diversity is obviously far greater 
now in a country of 210 million people in 50 States. 
In view of that enormous diversity, it is unlikely that all 
citizens in all part of the country place the same imporu 
tance on writings anr:I other works relating to all subjects, 
The subject matter to which the copyright clause is 
addressed may be of purely local importance and not 
worthy of national attention or protection. We cannot 
discern such an unyielding national interest as to require 
'an inference that state power to grant copyrights has been 
totally relinquished to exclusive federal control. 
The question to which we next turn is whether. in 
actual operation, the exercise of the power to grant copy-
13 As early as 1751, Massachusetts granted to Benjamin Crabb the 
exclusive right to employ a specific process for the manufacture of 
candles out of whale oil. It is not clear whether Crabb invented the 
process. The Acts and Resolves, Public and Private of the Province 
of Massachusetts Bay, Vol. III , Session of .Ian. 10, 1751, c. 19, 
at 546-547 ( 1878) . In 1780, Pennsylvania granted a patent to 
Henry Guest for the processing of tanning oil and blubber , noting 
specifically that the patent was '·a reward for his discovery and for 
the purpose of promoting useful manufactories in this state." Stat-
utes at Large of Pennsylvama 1682-1801, J. Mitchell and H . 
Flander~, eds. Vol. X, at 132 (1904). Similarly, South Carolma 
granted protection to Peter Belin in 1786 for devices which aided in 
the production of rice, a staple of South Carolina agriculture. 
Another patent relating to the processing of rice was granted in 
1788. -------------- ln 1787, Maryland 
granted a patent on a spinning and carding machine '' to encourage 
useful invention, as well as promote the manufacture of cotton and 
wool within this state . . .. " The Laws of Maryland, W. Litty, 
ed., Vol. II, Session of Nov. 6, 1786-Jan.20, 1787, c. 23 (1800) . In 
the same year, Pennsylvania patented certain devices relating to 
flour mills, notmg that these devices would " tend to simplify and 
render cheap the manufacture of flour which is one of the principal 
staples of this commonwealth. . " 
- 12 
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rights by some States will prejudice the interests of other 
States. As we have noted , a copyright granted by a 
particular State has effect only within its boundaries. 
If one State grants such protection, the interests of 
States which do not grant such protection are not preju-
diced since their citizens remain free to copy within their 
borders those works which may be protected elsewhere. 
The interests of a State which grants copyright protection 
may, however, be adversely affected by other States that 
do not; but this is inherent in the fact that a state copy-
right has no reach beyond its borders. Individuals 
who wish to purchase a copy of a work protected in 
their own State will be able to buy unauthorized copies in 
other States where no protection exists. However , this 
conflict is neither so inevitable nor so severe as to compel 
the conclusion that state power has been totally re-
linquished to the Congress. Obviously when some States 
do not grant copyright protection-as indeed most do 
not-that circumstance reduces the economic value of a 
state copyright, but it will hardly render that copyright 
worthless. The situation is no different from that which 
may arise in regard to other state monopolies, such as a 
food concession in a limited enclosure such as a state 
park or a state lottery; in each case, citizens may escape 
the effect of one State's monopoly by making purchases 
in another area or another State. Similiarly. in the case 
of state copyrights, except as to individuals willing to 
travel across state lines in order to purchase records or 
other writings protected in their own State, each State 's 
copyrights will still serve to induce new artistic creations 
within that State-the very objective of the grant of 
protection . We do not see here the type of prejudicial 
conflicts which would arise, for example , if each State 
exercised a sovereign power to impose imposts and 
tariffs; 14 nor can we discern a need for uniformity such 
14 The Federafo,t . N"o. 4:2, at :ms. 
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as that which may apply to the regulation of interstate 
shipments.1 5 
Similarly, it is difficult to see how the concurrent 
exercise of the power to grant copyrights by Congress 
and the States will necessarily and inevitably lead to 
difficulty. At any time Congress determines that a par-
ticular category of "writing" is worthy of national pro-
tection and the incidental expenses of federal adminis-
tration, federal copyright protection may be authorized. 
Where the need for free and unrestricted distribution of 
a writing is thought to be required by the national in-
terest, the copyright clause and the Commerce Clause 
would allow Congress to eschew all protection. In such 
cases, a conflict would develop if a State attempted to 
protect that which Congress intended to be free from 
restraint or to free that which Congress had protected. 
However, where Congress determines that neither federal 
protection nor freedom from restraint is required by the 
national interest, it is at liberty to stay its hand entirely. 11! 
Since state protection would not then conflict with fed-
eral action. total relinquishment of the States' power to 
grant copyright protection cannot be inferred . 
As we have seen, the language of the Constitution 
neither explicitly precludes the States from granting copy-
rights nor grants such authority exclusively to the Fed-
eral Government. The subject matter to which the 
copyright clause is addressed may at times be of purely 
local concern. No conflict will necessarily arise from 
a lack of uniform state regulation, nor will the interest 
of one State be significantly prejudiced by the actions of 
another. No reason exists why Congress must take 
1.s Cf. Morgan v Virginia, 328 U. S. 373; Bibb v . Navajo Freight 
Lines, 359 U.S. 520 ; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 ; 
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923) 
rn For example, Congres" has provided that wntings which may 
eventually be the subject of a federal copyright , may he protected 
under state law prior to publication. 17 11 . S. C ~ 2. 
14 
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affirmative action either to authorize protection of · all 
categories of writings or to free them from all restraint. 
We therefore conclude that, under the Constitution. -the 
States have not relinquished all power to grant to authors 
"the exclusive Right to their respective Writings." 
B 
Petitioners base an additional argument on the lan-
guage of the Constitution. The California statute for-
bids individuals from appropriating recordings at any 
time after release. From this, petitioners argue that the 
State has created a copyright of unlimited duration, in 
violation of that portion of Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, which pro-
vides that copyrights may only be granted "for limited 
Times.'' Read literally , the text of Art. I does not 
support petitioners' position. Section 8 enumerates 
those powers which have been granted to Congress ; 
whatever limitations have been appended to such powers 
can only be understood as a limit on congressional. and 
not state, action. Moreover. it is not clear that the 
dangers to which this limitation was addressed apply 
with equal force to both the Federal Government and 
the States, When Congress grants an exclusive right 
or monopoly, its effects are pervasive; no citizen or State 
may escape its reach . However, as we have noted above, 
the exclusive right granted by a State is confined to its 
borders. Even when the right is unlimited in duration, 
any tendency to inhibit further progress in science or the 
arts is therefore narrowly circumscribed . The challenged 
statute cannot he voided for lack of a durational 
limitation, 
III 
Our conclusion that California did not surrender its 
power to issue copyrights does not end the inquiry. We 
must proceed to determine whether the challenged state 
tatute is void under thP Supremacy Clause. No simple 
·11-1192-MEMO 
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formula can capture the complexities of this determina-
tion; the conflicts which may develop between state 
and federal action are as varied as the fields to which 
,congressional action may apply. "Our principal func-
tion is to determine whether, under the circumstances of 
this particular case, [ the state] law stands as an obstacle 
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 
U. S. 52, 67 (1941) . We turn then to federal copyright 
law to determine what objectives Congress intended to 
fulfill. 
By Art. l , § 8. c1. 8, of the Constitution , the States 
granted to Congress the power to protect the "Writings" 
of "Authors." These terms have not been construed 
in their narrow literal sense but , rather, with the 
reach necessary to reflect the broad scope of constitu-
tional principles. vVhile an ''author '' may be viewed as 
an individual who writes an original composition, the 
term in its constitutional sense has been construed to 
mean an "originator," "he to whom anything owes its 
origin .'' Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 
U. S. 53, 58 ( 1884). Similarly, although the word "writ-
ings" might be limited to script or printed material, it 
may be interpreted to include any physical rendering of 
the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor. 
Id. , Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, 94 (1879). Thus 
artistic performances placed on recordings may be within 
the reach of Clause 8. although this Court has not re-
solved that issue. 
While the area ill which Congress may act is broad, 
the enabling provision of Clause 8 does not require that it 
act in regard to all categories of materials which meet 
the constitutional definitions. Rather, whether any spe-
cific category of "Writings" is to be brought within the 
purview of the federal statutory scheme is left to the 
discretion of the Congress. The history of federal copy-
16 
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right statutes indicates that the congressional determ1naa 
tion to consider specific classes of writings is dependent 
not only on the character of the writing, but also on the 
commercial importance of the product to the national 
economy. As our technology has expanded the means 
available for creative activity and has provided economi-
cal means for reproducing manifestations of such activity, 
new areas of federal protection have been initiated .1 1 • 
1.7 The first congressional copyright statute, passed in 1790, gov-
erned only maps, charts , and books. Act of May 31, 1790, c. 15, 
1 Stat. 124. In 180:2. the Act was amended in order to grant pro-
tection to any person ·'who shall invent and design, engrave, etch 
or work .. an:,, historical or other print or prints. . _,. Act of 
April 29, 1802, c :36, :2 Stat. 171 Protection was extended to mu-
sical compos1t1ons when the copynght law,, were revised in 1831 
Act of Feb :3, 1831 , c. 16, 4 Stat . 436. In 1865, at the time when 
Mathew Brady 's pictures of the Civil War were attaining notoriet _\·, 
photographs and photographic negatives were exp ressly added to 
the list of protected words. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, c. 123 , 13 Stat, 
540. Again in 1870, the hst was augmented to cover paintings, 
drawings, chromos, statuettes, statuary, and models or designs of fine 
art . Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, 16 Stat. 198 
In 1909, Congres;; agreed to a maJor con~olida t 1on ,llld am(•1Hl-
ment of all federal copynght statute:;. A list of 11 categone::; uf 
protected work was provided. The relevant ::;ect10m, ol thP Act arc• 
discussed 111 the text of our op1111on . The House Report on the p10-
posed bill specifically noted that amendment was required because 
"the reproduction of various things which are the subject of copy-
right has enormously mcreased , ' and that the President has specif-
ically recommended revis10n, among other reasons, because the prior 
laws "om1tlted] protection for many articles which, under modern 
reproductive processes, are entitled to protect10n. " H. R. Rep. No. 
2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1909 J, at 1 ( quot mg Samuel J . Elder 
and President Theodore Roosevelt) 
Since 1909 , two addit10nal amendment;; have been added . ln 
1912, the list of categorie,; Ill § 5 was expanded to mclude motion 
pictures. The House Report on the amendment noted : 
"The occasion for this proposed amendment is the fact that the 
product1011 of mot1on-p1cture photoplays and motion pictures other 
than photoplays has become a business of vast proportions. The-
money lnve;;ted therein LS ~o great and the property rights so valu~ 
71-1192-MEMO 
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Petitioners contend that the actions taken by Congress 
in establishing federal copyright protection preclude the 
States from granting similar protection to recordings of 
ipusical performances. According to petitioners, Con-
gress, in 1909, addressed the question of whether record-
ings of performances should be granted protection. In 
petitioners' view, Congress determined that any individ-
ual who was entitled to a copyright on an original musical 
composition should have the right to control to a limited 
extent the use of such composition on recordings, but 
that the record itself, and the performance which it was 
capable of reproducing were not worthy of such protec-
tion.' " In support of their claim, petitio1wrs cite tlw 
House Report on the 1900 Act. which states 
" lt is not the intention of the committee to extend 
the right of copyright to the mechanical reproduc-
tions themselves. but only to give the composer or 
copyright proprietor the control. in accordance w1th 
the provisions of the bill, of the manufacture and 
use of such devices." H . R. Rep ~o 2222. fiOth 
Cong .. 2d Sess .. ~) ( H:lO~J 1 
The technology of 1973 and that of 1909 present very 
di:fferen t pictures. When viewed from the perspective of 
able that thf> committef> is of thr opinion that thr copyright law;, 
ought to bf' ~o amended a~ to give to them d1stmct and definite 
recognition and protrct1011: · H R Rep No 75n . 62rl Cong., 2d 
Sess ., at 1 i 1912) 
Fmally. in 1971 . § 5 wa,._ amt'1Hlf'd to indude · ~oulld n:·cordmg~ "' 
Congress wao: spurred , o act10n by the growth of record pinlC) 
which wm, 111 turn duf' partly to technolog1cal advances. See Hear-
ings on S. fi46 r=tnd H n. f\927 before Subcommittee No. :3 of thP 
Committ ee on the .Jud1 c1a r:1·, House of Repre8entatiVf>s, 92d Cong., 
ht Se;;s. , at 4-5 , 11 (1971) . It must be remembered that the 
" record p1rac< charged against petitioners relat ed to recording~ 
fixed by the ongrnal producer prior to Feh. Jf> , 1972 . thP pffrrtJvP 
dati, of the 1971 Act SrP 11 fi ,u,pro. 
1 , L". l.'. ..:;_ C ~ l 1,, • 
1 
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the modern world i11 which high hdelity recordings are 
commonplace. petit10ners · 111terpretation of the 1909 
statute and H . R. Rep . Xo. 2222 sf'ems plausible. Hov. -
ever. to read the H:lO!-J statute and the report as if 
they had been wntten today against a background of 
what 1s no"'· well-knowu technology inevitably dis-
torts their rntended meamng. Lu 1831, Congress first 
extended federal copynght protf'ct1011 to original musical 
compositions. An rndividual who possessed such a copy-
right had the exclusive authority to sell copies of the 
musical scon', ind1v1duals who purchased such a copy 
did so for the most part to play the composition at homP 
on piano or othf'r instrument Between 1831 and 190!-J 
numerous rnstrurnt'nts were rnventecl whicl1 allowed the 
composition tu he reproduced mechanically For ex 
ample. one had only tu msert a piano roll or disc with 
perforat1011s lll appropnatr places rnto a player piano 
tu achieve almost the samf' results which previously re-
quired someone capable of playrng thf' 111strume11t. Thf' 
mounting sales of such devices detracted from the value of 
thf' copyright granted for the musical composition . l1Jd1-
v1duals who had use of a piano roll had little if any need 
for a copy of the sheet music.' " The problems which 
arose f'veutually reached this Court in 1908 in the casP 
of White-f:imith Music Publishing Co. " · Apollo Co., 109 
C S. 1 r 1908 l Therf' , the Apollo Company had manu-
factured piano rolls capable of reproducing mecharncally 
composit10ns covered by a copyright owned by appel -
lant. Appellant contended that the piano rolls con-
stituted "copies" of the copynghted composition and that 
theJr sale. without perm1ssio11 . constituted an rnfringe-
ment of the copyright. The Court held that piano rolls . 
af'- well as rf'cords. werP not "cop1Pf'., . 111 LPrms of thP fed-
''' H H Hep '.\o 70X:l. -~!-!rh \ 'ong , '.!rl Se~~- . p1 2. al '.! ( 190; \ 
( .\,linonfy HPpp r1 l, 
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eral copyright statutes, but were merely component part · 
of a machine which executed the copyrighted composi-; 
t1011. 2" Despite the fact that the piano rolls employed 
the creative works of the composer. all protection was 
derned 
· lt 1s agarnst this background that Congress passed the · 
1909 statute. After porntedly wa1tm?: for the Court 's 
decision in Jr hite-Smith Music Publishing Company,"'. 
Congress determined that the copyright statutes should. 
be amended to rnsure that composers of original musical 
works received adequate protection to encourage further 
artistic and creative effort. Henceforth . under ~ l (el 
records and piano rolls Wf'f't:' tu bf' considered as "copH's '' 
of the original composition they 1,1·np capable of rPpro-
ducmg, and coulrl not bP rrnrnufactured unless payme111 
was ·made to the p,rnpriPtor of the composition copyrit;h t 
ThP section of the House RPport cited by petitioners was 
intended only to establish the lirruts of th.e composer's 
right; composers were to have no control over the re 1 · ' 
cord1ngs themselves . '.\'owht>re doPs the report indieate · 
that Congress considered records as a11ything but a com-
ponPnt part of a machine . capablP of reproducing an orig · 
inal composit1011 2 2 1Jr t,hiu Congres::; 111temled rf'cords. a~ . 
20 ·After all. what 1,- th.- JH:•rforatPd roll ·1 Thf' fact i:; clear!., ·. 
estabh~lwd on thf' tf'>'ttmom· m thi~ ca~(• that Pven tho~f' skillf'd ui' ' . 
the makmg ol thn,P roU:;: arP unablt· ru n·a<i them a:- mu~1cal com-· · 
position~ . as tho,;t 1n ,;talf notat1011 an· rtad b~• tlw pnformn 
· ·These perforated roll;.; arP part:, of a rnachtnf' which , when dul) 
applied and properly opPratPd 111 eon1wct1011 wnh thP mf'charnsrn 
to which they arp adaptf'd . product:' mu~H'::tl tonP,,- rn harmon1011::-, .. 
rombmat1on But w.- cannot 1h111k that thP_v arP coplf'>' w1thm the 
meaning of !lw ropynght act 20!:J l" :-; . at li-
·n H . R Hf'p No 708:{, suµta , n Ii-. Part I. at !U . Part 11, at ,3-/ 
"' Thi~ ,,, p;;pecially cln1r from th( commt•n1 rn,tdf' by thf' Com-
mittPt• on Patent, 1n rPgard to , torf'1g11 :;tatlttP which , to ~on1E' 
PXtPnt. protPcted pf'r~onaJ performancP:-- . The committee "tatf'd that 
rhp lnrp1g11 :-httlltP "in no wa,· HffP<•f,- thp rPprodurrion of such 
'ii- I H-12- \fDfC' 
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renderings of ori{/ll1al artistic µerf ormanr.;e to be free from, 
state control.2" 
Petitioners' argument does not rest entirely on the 
belief that Congress intended specifically tu exempt re-
cordings of performances from state control. Assuming 
that no such intention may be found, they argue that 
Congress so occupied the field of copyright protection 
as to pre-empt all comparable state actwn . Rice , . 
Santa Fe Elevator Corporation, 331 C ;-;_ 218 ( 1947) . 
This assertion 1s based ou the language of 17 G. S. C 
~S 4 and 5. and on this Court's opinions in .Sears, Roe-
buck and ('o v Stiffel ('o .. :37fi P . S. 2'2.5 (1964), a11d 
mm;ic by rhonograph:;, gra phophoue::-, or t ht- ordmar> piano pla>·mg 
instruments, tor 111 rhe,:e m~truments rlw r<'prod11ctio11 '" pur<'h 
mecha111cal ·· H H Rep. ~o '2222, ouµru. n lti at .5 
"' Pern10nl'r" rlo 1101 argue that § !i5;jh ronH1ct" ,,·irh rhat port1011 
of 17 l' S. C ~ I (f'I which provide,-
. [ WJ he never tlw owner of ,t mu:;1cal ropvnghr ha,-, ttsf'd or rw1-
mitted or know111gly acqme~crd 111 rhr use of the copynghted work 
upon rhr part:, of mstrument:; serv111g to reproducP mecharncally tlw 
mu~1cal work, au>· other prr:;011 may makP ,mmlar us<' of the copy-
righted work upon tlw pa_,·mPnt to thP cop>·rtght proprwtor of a 
ro>·,dty ol two eent~ ou ea d1 ~uch pa rt ma uuf:-ict u rPd 
A:,;summg argueudo that pPt1t1oners use uf tlw compos1t1on tlw_, 
duplicated co n::;tJtutl·~ a ~11rnlar 11~P, tlH' cJ1alln1gnl ::;tat(' :;tatut(. 
might be claimed to d1m1111:,;h thP return which 1::; due the composer 
by lei;i;en rng the number of cop1e,; produced, a11d thu~ to conflict 
with § J (P) . However , a8 we havP 11oted above, the mean,- pre:,-
entl~· available for reproducmg record111gr,, were not 111 ex1,;tence 111 
J90Y when 17 l ' S C. § l (e/ wa,, passrd. We ::;et' 110 rndicat1011 tha.t 
the challenged ,;tate :;tatme detract;; from royalties which Congre,;;. 
intended the compo::;er to receive Furthermore, many ,;tate ,;tatute::; 
ma~· dun1111sh thP number of copie;: produced Taxmg statutP:;, for 
Pxample. may ra1,;e the cost of produc111g or ~ell111g recordb and 
therrb.Y IPssen tlw numher of record::; wluch ma>· be sold or 111h1b11 
new compa111es from entermg this fiPld ol commerce WP do not 
see 111 these :;tature,- thP rlirrr1 con H1ct 11 rce~sar\' to render a ~1an:'· 
-:1Ht111P lllV;JfJO_ 
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Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U. S. 234 
(1964) . 
- ection 4 of the federal copyright laws provides : 
"[T] he works for which copyrights may be secured 
under this Act shall includP all writings of an 
autho1 . 
Sect1011 5, which lists specific catAgones of protected 
works, adds . 
" [T]he above specifications shall not be held to limit 
the subject-matter of copyright as defined in sectiou 
four of this Act o 
Since ~ 4 employs the constitutional term ''writings,· i 4 
1t may be argued that Congress rntended to exercise It~ 
authority over all works to which the constitutional pro-
vision might apply. However, m the more thau oO years 
which have transpired since enactment of this provision, 
neither the Copyright Office. the courts. nor the Con-
gress has so interpreted it. The Register of Copyrights. 
who is charged with administration of the statute, has 
consistently ruled that "claims to exclusive rights 111 
mechamcal recordings . , or m the performances they 
reproduce" are not en titled to protection under * 4. ;37 
CFR ~ 20:2.8 (b) ( 1972) ."' With one early exception."'; 
·,, H. H. Hep .\o 22:22, sup,a, 11. lb , at JU. 
2 ' The reg1strnt1on of record;; under t,he provis10n8 of thP 1909 Act 
would give rn,e to 11111nerou1,, admimst rat1w difficultie:, . It is difficult 
To discern how a n mdividuaJ who wished to copyright a record could 
comply with the notice and deposit provision~ of the :,tatute. 17 
L'. S. C §§ 1:2 , l:3 , 19, 20. I\'or 1;, 1t clear to whom the copyright 
could rightfully be issued or what const1tutPd publicat10n. Finally , 
the, admmistrat1vc, and economic burden of class1fyrng and ma111ta111-
ing copies of records would have been considerable. Sec, ChafPe , 
Reflect1ons on the Law of Copyright IL -!5 Col L. Rev . 719 . , :15 
( l94,'i I Hmger, Tlw Unauthonzed Duphration of ~onnd RPcordmg~ . 
Foot>1ote iii '·-' 01, r 22 J 
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American courts have agreed with this mterpretatio11; 21 
and in 1972, prior to passage of the statute which ex-
tended federal protection to recordings fixed on or after 
Feb. 15, 1972, Congress acknowledged the validity of 
that interpretation. Both the House and Senate Re-
ports on the proposed leg1slatio11 recognized that re-
cordings qualified as ''writings" within the meaning of 
the Constitution, but had uot prevwusly been protected 
under the federal copyright statute. H. R. Rep. No. 
92-487, at 2, 5; S. Rep. No. 92-72, at 4. In light of 
this consistent interpretation by the courts, the agency 
empowered to administer the copyright statutes, and 
Congress itself, we cannot agree that ~~ 4 and f> have 
the broad scope petitioners claim 
Sears and Cornpco, on which petitioners rely, uo not 
support their position. In those cases, the questwn was 
whether a State could. under principles of state unfair 
competition law, preclude the copying of mechanical 
configurations which did not possess the qualities required 
for the granting of a federal design or mechanical patent. 
The Court stated · 
"[T]he patent system is one rn which uniform fed -
eral standards are carefully used to promote inven-
tion while at the same time preserving free compe-
tition. Obviously a State could not, consistently 
with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. 
extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration 
Studies Prepared fo r the SubcommJttpe 011 Patent~. Trademarks, and 
Copyright~ of the Committee on the Judiciary, Un ited State;:; Senat<' . 
86th Cong .. 2d Se::;,;., at 2 (1961). HPann1;s on S fi46 and H. R . 6927 , 
supra, n. 19 , a1 11, 14 
2"Fonotopia Limited v Bradley. 171 Fed. %1 , 9tl3 (EDNY 1909), 
"' Aeolian Co . v Royal Mus1.c Roll Co .. 19(i Fed. 926, 927 (WDNY 
1912): Waring v WDAS Broadcasting Statio11, 327 Pa. 433, 437-438. 
(1937) ; Capitol Records v Mercury Records Corp., 221 F. 2d 657, 
661-662 (CA2 1955) ; Jerome v Twentieth C'e-nturu Fox-Film C'orp .. 
ti7 F. Supp '7:~7 742 (_SDNY 1946\ , 
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date or give a patent 011 an article lacking the level 
of invention required for federal patents. To do 
either would run counter to the policy of Congress 
of granting patents only to true inventions, and 
then only for a limited time. Just as a State can-
not encroach upon the federal patent laws directly, 
it cannot, under some other law, such as that for-
bidding unfair competition, give protection of a kind 
that clashes with the objectives of the federal patent 
laws.·· Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Stiffie Co., 376 
"C. S., at 230-231 (1964) (footnotes omitted). 
In regard to mechamcal configurations, Congress had 
balanced the need to encourage innovation and originality 
of invention against the need to insure competition in 
the sale of identical or substantially identical products. 
The standards established for the granting of federal 
patent protection to machines th us indicated not only 
the articles Congress wished to protect. but which con-
figurations it wished to remain fret> . The application 
of state law in these cases to prPvent the copying of 
articles which did not meet the reqUJrements for federal 
protection disturbed the careful balance which Congress 
had drawn and thPreby necessarily gave way under thP 
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. No comparable 
conflict betweetJ statP law and federal law arises in the 
case of recordings of musical performances. In regard 
to this category of writings , Congress has drawn no bal-
ance; rather, they have left the area unattended , and 
no reason exists why the ~tatP should not be free to act.2~ 
2" Pet1t10ners place great st rei:;:; on their belief that the records or 
tapes which they copied had been "published " We have no need 
to determrne whether. under state law. these recordmgs had been pub-
lJ;;hed or what legal consequences such pubhcat10n might have. For 
purposes of federal law, "pubhcat10n " serves only as a term of the 
art wluch defines the legal relationships which Congress has adopted 
\mcler the ferlernl ropvnght , t::it11tes A~ to categon es of writmp:s 
24 
71-1192-1rE'.\Io 
GOLDSTEIK v . CALIFOTI.\'IA 
IV 
More than 50 years ago, Justice Brandeis observed 
in dissent in International Xews Service v. Associated 
Press : 
"The general rule of law 1s, that the noblest of 
human productions-knowledge. truths ascertained, 
conceptions, and ideas-become. after voluntary 
communications to others free as the air to common 
use." 248 U. S. 215. 250 ( 1918 ) 
But there is no fixed, immutable hne to tell us what 
''human productions" are private property and which 
are so general as to become ''free as the air ·· In earlier 
times. a performing artist ·s work was largely restricted 
to the stage; once performerJ . it remamed "recorded" 
only in the memory of those who had seen or heard it .. 
Today. we can record that performance in precise detail 
and reproduce it agam and agarn with utmost fidelity . 
The California statutory scheme evidences a legislative 
policy to prohibit "piracy" by the unauthorized repro-
duction of recordings. because the State concluded that 
such "piracy" adversely affected the continued produc-
tion of new recordings which represents a large industry 
in California Accordingly . the :-itate has. by statute. 
given to recordings the attributes of property. No re-
straint has been placed on the use of an idea or concept; 
rather, petitioners and other individuals remain free to 
record the same compositions in precisely the same man-
ner and with the same personnel as appeared on the 
original recording . Even if it were to be assumed that 
Congress intended to occupy the field of copyrights for 
recordings by virtue of the 1971 Act. that Act expressly 
provides · "[:\ Jothing in title 17. United States Code. 
which Conµ:rPc;~ ha:- 1101 brouµ;ht wn h1n I lw ,ro1w of t hp teclPral. 
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as amended by . .. this Act, shall be applied retro-
actively or be coustrued as affecting in any way any . 
rights with respect to sound recordings fixed before the 
effective date of this Act [Feb. 15, 1972] .' ' We con-
clude that the State has exercised a power which it re-
tained and that the California statute, as applied in the 
present case, does not intrude into an area which Con-
gress has. up to now, pre-empted , and does not conflict 
in any manner with objectives wh ich Congress iutended 
to achieve. Until and unless Congress takes further 
action with respect to recordings fixed before .Feb. 15, 
1972. § 653h may be enforced to prevent individuals from 
engaging in acts of "piracy" such as those which occurred 
in the present ca8e, 






ix~EMi~x The Chief's opinion in Goldstein EEJ(lta:ii:J(IS reads in places 
like a law review article and contains some unnecessary ~:istXE¥ history -----------
and rather discursive and obscure analysis. I do think, however, that 
it covers the main point e that state action in the~ copyright field is 
_,,,,,,..._ ....... __ ..,,.....,,_ ... - ~ -- - -
not constitutionally or sta~txE statutorily preempted absent some 
Mm direct expression by Congress that it intended to legislate in a~ 
....... -........ ... ..., 
a given copyright area. A good summary of the Chief's ~E:i ~Est position -..___, 
exists on pa,< 24-25."")Since you are ~e~xx ~RJ(IRX2i¥ generally of the 
mind that st~~exxgaJ(IXEe xs~EMi~xE~XEexaiiE~e~x initiatives are 
diso.llD ,J 
permissible absent some rather clear congressional attempt to 
them, a join in this case would support your general view and certainly 
Ee am maintain consistency with Dublin •• In addition, the activities of 
petrs in this case are really outrageous and are properly called "piracy". 
In sum: I would join (1) because the Chief's position xsxaiEJ(l~xt~e 
• c•/:te i:ii:J(les iiJ(IHS takes roughly the same view of state P~UR :'nl!!) power that you 
• 
have advocated in Dublin •; (2) the xes~it restraints ~ piracy California 
~r~ 
has sE~x sought to achieve - EE~iEMi E~ obviously -a. sensible ones; 
and (3) the opinion evidences a good deal of work and is a respectable 
if ~i~~i¥ somewhat obscure and academic treatment of the subject. 
JOI N JH W 
p~ 
- CHAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
( 
~ 
.ittpUntt ~ tHtrt cf tlrt 'Jllttitt~ .:§tatta 
Jlas-Irmgtttn. ~. <q. 20~,~~ 
June 6, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1192, Goldstein v. California 
Dear Chief, 
I think this is an excellent job and would · 
be glad to join it as an opinion for the Court. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely, 
17_ <:; / 
'/ 
/l-'I ~ . 
~ ~ / J-~ ~~ 
J;--- u ) 
c.+-v-c-/ lL.c, ..-1 ~ 
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✓ 
- CHAMBERS OF 
$5u:prtmt {qttttti ttf fltt 'Jtl'tritth .;%taftg 
'J!iaglfi:ttgfon. ~. <!f. 2llffe~.;l 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 6, 1973 
., 
·, 
Re: No. 71-1192 - Goldstein v. California 
Dear Chief: 
case. 
I agree with the memorandum you have prepared in this 
Sincerely,; 
The Chief Justice 





June 7, 1973 
No. 71-1192 Goldstein v. California 
Dear Chief: 
I will be happy to join you when your-fine memorandum is 
converted into an opinion for the Court. 
The Chief .Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
-
..§nprtmt <!j:omt llf tfrt ~nilth ~taf:tn 
1Danlfin:gto-n. ~. <!j:. 2llffe'}~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 7, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1192 - Goldstein v. Ca lifornia 
Dear Chief: 
Your memorandum would be satisfactory 
to me as an opinion for the Court. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to Conference 
✓ 
- ~u.premt ~ottrl cf tlre 'Jilnifrh ~tntts ~itsqhtgto-n, g). QJ. 20p)i~ CHAMBER ~~ OF" 
JUSTICE WM. J. B R ENNAN, JR. June 11, 1973 
RE: No. 71-1192 Goldstein v. California 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join n1e in your dissenting 
opinion in the above. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 




- ,j1qrrmu <!J:,ru:rt of tli t 'Jilnitth .;§tntt.s 'J/l!hu.lritt-!ita-n. lI}. <!f. 2llffe>!-,3 CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR. June 11, 1973 
RE: No. 71-1192 - Goldstein v. California 
Dear Bill: 
Please join n,e in your dissenting 
opinion in the above. 
Mr. Justice Douglas 






- CHAMBE R S OF 
j;u.pumt <!Jottd llf tltt 'Jllttiltb' ~i:attg 
-.iu!rht-gtett. ~ - <!J. 20 ~)1,~ 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
June 14, 1973 
Re: No. 71-1192 - Goldstein, et al. v. California 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
;! ?.-4, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
• 
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